This paper revisits the results of Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) on the impact of R&D spillovers on growth. We extend their analysis to include an additional 15 years of data on firm R&D and performance, and update the measures of firms' interactions in technology space and product market space. We show that the magnitude of spillovers appears to have been broadly stable over the past few decades. In comparison to the earlier analysis, indeed we find stronger evidence of strategic complementarity in R&D and a larger gap between the marginal social return and the marginal private return to R&D, with the marginal social return exceeding the marginal private return by a factor of 4.
Research and Development (R&D) spillovers have been a major topic in the growth, productivity and industrial organization literatures for many decades. Theoretical studies have explored the impact of research and development (R&D) on the strategic interaction among firms and long run growth.
1 While many empirical studies appear to support the presence of technology spillovers, there remains a major problem at the heart of the literature. This arises from the fact that R&D generates at least two distinct types of "spillover" effects. The first is technology (or knowledge) spillovers which may increase the productivity of other firms that operate in similar technology areas, and the second type of spillover is the product market rivalry effect of R&D.
Whereas technology spillovers are beneficial to firms, R&D by product market rivals has a negative effect on a firm's value. Despite a large amount of theoretical research on product market rivalry effects of R&D (including patent race models), there has been very little econometric work on such effects, in large part because it is difficult to distinguish the two types of spillovers using existing empirical strategies.
It is important to identify the empirical impact of these two types of spillovers.
Econometric estimates of technology spillovers in the literature may be severely contaminated by product market rivalry effects, and it is difficult to ascertain the direction and magnitude of potential biases without building a model that incorporates both types of spillovers. Furthermore, even if there is no such bias, we need estimates of the impact of product market rivalry in order to asses whether there is over-or under-investment in R&D. If product market rivalry effects dominate technology spillovers, the conventional wisdom that there is under-investment in R&D could be overturned.
One way to address this issue was introduced by Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) , hereafter BSV. Their methodology tried to separately identify two types of research and development (R&D) spillovers: technology spillovers which are beneficial and arise when knowledge flows to the firm from other firms which use similar technologies, and product market rivalry spillovers which are harmful and arise due to business stealing of the firm's competitors. This is accomplished by distinguishing between firms' position in technology space, measured by patenting across technology classes, and position in product market space, measured by sales across four digit industries.
In this paper, we use the BSV methodology to separately identify the technology spillovers and the product market rivalry effects of R&D and reexamine the effect of R&D spillovers on several firm outcomes (market value, patenting, productivity, and R&D). Our panel data includes nearly three times as many firms as BSV because of updates to the underlying data sources and the passage of time. The magnitudes of spillovers are quite similar to those reported in BSV. We find large statistically significant technology spillovers and smaller product market rivalry effects. Interestingly, and in contrast to the earlier results, we find that R&D of firms' product market rivals reduces patenting. We also find somewhat stronger evidence of strategic complementarity in R&D among firms. Finally, we use our estimates to conduct a welfare analysis, showing that the marginal social return to R&D (57.7%) exceeds 3 the marginal private return to R&D (13.6%) by 44.1%.
The original BSV paper built on a long line of research, perhaps most saliently with the work of Griliches (1992) . Many authors have subsequently extended the BSV approach. Manresa (2015) generalizes the approach to modelling spillovers in a modified panel data "Pooled" Lasso approach. Lychagin et al. (2015) take a semiparametric approach and introduce a third spillover aspect based on geographical closeness, which they show is independently important. Colino (2017) adds a dynamic spillover measure which takes into account when past R&D may create future spillovers using citation information (finding this particularly important in industries with complex products that build cumulatively on multiple components).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data and measurement of key variables, including the measures of technological proximity and product market proximity which are central to the analysis. Next, we review the econometric framework and theoretical predictions of the BSV model of firms' production, patenting, and knowledge production. We then present the estimation results and conduct a welfare analysis. Then, we conclude with a few remarks.
Data
In this section we discuss the construction of our dataset, highlighting where updates have been made to the BSV data. The complete dataset and all replication files are available online at www.https://people.stanford.edu/nbloom/research. 4
Sample Construction
We combine three primary data sources to create the analysis sample. First, data on firm patenting and patent citations are from the NBER Patent Data Project.
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The NBER patent data includes data from the U.S. 
where T iτ is the share of firm i's patents in technology class τ . The Jaffe (1986) measure of technological proximity between firm i and firm j is given by:
The pool of technology spillovers to firm i in year t, SP ILLT ECH it , is the the stock of R&D of all the firms with which firm i interacts in technology space, weighted by the Jaffe (1986) measure of technological proximity. Specifically,
where G jt if firm j's stock of R&D in year t.
Measuring Product Market Proximity
Product market proximity is measured using line of business data from the Compustat Segment Dataset, which provides each firm's sales disaggregated by four digit industry code. We begin by defining the vector S it = (S i1t , S i2t , ..., S i473t ), where S ikt is the share of firm i's sales in industry k from year t − 5 to year t − 1. Rather than pool across all years to construct firm industry sales share, we pool the previous five years of data. Pooling the segments data across all 35 years is problematic in this setting. Future industry sales shares are clearly endogenous as firm innovation and R&D affects subsequent product market success. Past sales shares do not suffer from endogeneity but will be mismeasured if firms move in product space over time.
While the results in BSV are robust to using lagged, future or pooled segments data, our data cover a much longer time period which likely exacerbates the endogeneity and measurement problems introduced by pooling the data. We therefore use the 5 previous years of firm sales in order to (a) minimize reverse causality between firm outcomes and product market competition and (b) accurately measure the firm's time t location in product market space. The results do not appear sensitive to this choice -using the firm's previous 10 years or 20 years of sales produces similar estimates. Product market proximity is measured by the correlation of firms' sales across four digit industries:
The pool of product market spillovers to firm i in year t, SP ILLSIC it , is the stock of R&D of all the firms with which firm i interacts in product market space, weighted by our measure of product market proximity. Specifically,
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Mahalanobis Extension
We also construct alternatives versions of SP ILLT ECH and SP ILLSIC using the Mahalanobis distance metric. This measure allows for spillovers between different technology classes, which is ruled out by the Jaffe metric, by using the within-firm covariance of patenting across classes to identify the distance between technology classes.
To explain the calculation of the Mahalanobis normed measure we require addi- 
in which each column is simply normalized by the firm's patent share dot product. N ) and is the i th row of T . This matrix X is similar to T , except it is the normalized patent class shares across firms rather than firm shares across patent classes. Finally, we can define the (426, 426) matrix Ω = X X in which each element is the standard Jaffe (1986) uncentered correlation measure between patent classes (rather than between firms). So, for example, if patent classes i and j coincide frequently within the same firm, then Ω ij will be close to 1 (with Ω ii = 1), while if they never coincide within the same firm Ω ij will be 0. On the other hand, if some patent classes tend to overlap frequently within firmssuggesting they have some kind of technological spillover -then the overlap between firms sharing these patent classes will be higher.
The Mahalanobis normed technology closeness measure is defined as T ECH

Sample and Descriptive Statistics
To be included in our sample firms must have segments and accounting data at some time between 1980 and 2015, and must have applied for a patent at some point between 1970 and 2006. We also drop firms with less than 4 years of data and with large jumps in sales and employment in consecutive years, which may be indicative of M&A activity. We exclude the first 5 years of data (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) from all regressions in order to construct the knowledge stock measures. Table 1 Compared to BSV, the firms in our sample have higher Q, are more R&D-intensive across measured by R&D stock, flow, and stock scaled by physical capital, and they patent more often. Our firms are on average smaller in terms of market value, sales, physical capital, and employment than the firms in the old BSV sample because the increased match sample included many medium and smaller Compustat firms.
Econometric Framework
We are interested in estimating the effects of R&D spillovers and product market rivalry on four firm outcomes: market value, R&D spending, productivity, and citation-weighted patenting. Theory has clear predictions for the first two firm outcomes, while productivity and patenting are used to proxy for knowledge. Market value should be increasing in the size of the pool of R&D spillovers from technologically similar firms (SP ILLT ECH) and decreasing in the size of the pool of spillovers from product market rivals (SP ILLSIC). Patenting and productivity should be increasing in SP ILLT ECH. Lastly, the theoretical predictions for the effects of spillovers on R&D depend on whether firms' R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
The theoretical predictions vary depending on whether R&D undertaken by firms' product market rivals is a strategic substitute or a strategic complement. R&D is increasing in SP ILLSIC in the case of strategic complements and decreasing in the case of strategic substitutes. The relationship between R&D and SP ILLT ECH is ambiguous because it depends on how technology spillovers affect the firm's marginal product of R&D.
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Market Value Equation
We estimate the effect of R&D spillovers on market value in the following specification:
where Q it is Tobin's Q, φ
is a higher-order (sixth in the baseline specification) polynomial in the lagged R&D stock divided by the stock of non-R&D assets, 
Patent Equation
We estimate a negative binomial of citation-weighted patents:
where P it is future citations weighted patents for firm i's patents applied for in year t and G it−1 is lagged R&D capital stock. The firm fixed effect η i is measured as the pre-sample average citation-weighted patents. One concern with using citationsweighted patents is that more recently issued patents have had less time to garner 11 citations than older patterns. We address this by including year fixed effects in all specifications.
Productivity Equation
The production function is Cobb-Douglas in R&D capital, labor, and non-R&D capital, with additional terms for R&D spillovers:
where Y it is real sales, X it includes labor and capital, and η 
R&D Equation
R&D factor demand is:
where R it is the flow of R&D spending.
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The estimates of the market value equation are presented in Table 2 . All specifications, in this table and throughout the paper, include year and firm fixed effects. In column (1) we present the estimates from BSV for comparison. In column (2) we find a strong positive relationship between SP ILLT ECH and market value and a strong negative relationship between market value and SP ILLSIC. R&D by technologically similar firms increases firm value. 3 Conversely R&D by firms' product market rivals reduces firm value. Interestingly these coefficient estimates are remarkably similar to those reported in BSV and reproduced in column (1). In columns (3) and (4) we include only the technology spillover or the product market competition spillover, and the estimated spillover effects are somewhat smaller but overall very similar. Column (5) uses the Mahalanobis metric to measure the distance between firms in product market space. Recall that while the Jaffe measure imposes zero spillovers across different technology classes (industries) for T EC (SIC), the Mahalanobis metric allows for these inter-class (inter-industry) spillovers by using the empirical co-patenting (co-sales) rates to measure the distance between different technology classes (product markets). Using the Mahalanobis metric increases the coefficient estimates of both spillovers measures by roughly 60 percent in absolute magnitude. 4 Finally, in Column (6) we estimate the market value equation using 3 The ln(R&D/capital) coefficient reported in Table 2 is the coefficient on the 1st order term in the 6th order polynomial in ln(R&D/capital). The estimates are quantitatively similar if we only only include the 1st order term. For example, estimating the specification in column 2 but omitting higher order R&D terms yields a coefficient (standard error) of 0.352 (0.041) on ln(SPILLTECH), -0.079 (0.013) on ln(SPILLSIC), and 0.139 (0.006) on ln(R&D/capital).
4 The SP ILLSIC coefficient is 59 percent larger and SP ILLT EC is 62 percent larger
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R&D tax credits to instrument for SP ILLT EC and SP ILLSIC. While the relationship between product market spillovers and market value is essentially unchanged compared to our preferred specification with the Jaffe metric and firm fixed effects in column (2), the positive association between technology spillovers and market value falls by two-thirds. Table 3 displays the estimates of the patent equation. In column (2) we regress log of cite weighted patents on our two spillovers measures, the R&D stock, a firm presample fixed effect which controls for the firm's average citation weighted patents in the pre-sample period 5 , and the log of lagged patents. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on ln(R&D Stock) confirms that firms with more R&D capital produce more patents.
We find a somewhat smaller positive relationship between SP ILLT ECH and patenting compared to BSV, and a negative relationship between SP ILLSIC and patenting in contrast to BSV's finding of no relationship. Omitting either SP ILLSIC in column (3) or SP ILLT EC in column (4) attenuates the remaining spillover coefficients slightly. The estimates using the Mahalanobis measure and the Jaffe measure with instrumental variables are quantitatively similar to the fully specified model in (2). Table 4 summarizes the estimates of the production function. Comparing column
(1) and column (2), the results on our new sample are similar to the old estimates, although we find slightly larger positive effects of technology spillovers on productivity. There is no significant relationship between product market spillovers and productivity, with the coefficient on log SP ILLSIC estimated precisely and close to 5 The pre-sample period is defined as the 5 years before the firm enters the regression sample.
14 zero. The inputs in production -labor, physical capital, and R&D capital -enter the production function positively and significantly. The productivity effects are similar when we use the Mahalanobis measure in column (5) or use tax credit instruments in column (6).
The R&D-intensity estimates are summarized in Table 5 . We find a positive relationship between both types of spillovers and R&D-intensity. In our preferred specification a 10% increase in SP ILLT EC is associated with an 12.5% increase in R&D-intensity; a 10% increase in SP ILLSIC is associated with a 5.4% increase in R&D-intensity.
In summary, our updated estimates are quite similar to the findings in BSV with 2 notable exceptions. A significant difference between the results we present and the original estimates of BSV is our finding in Table 3 of a strong negative relationship between firm patenting and R&D at the firm's product market competitors. This can be rationalized in a model with endogenous patenting decisions. The intuition is that R&D by firm's competitors reduces the marginal benefit of R&D and thus the firm's propensity to patent. 6 Note, though, that this result relies on strategic substitutability of R&D between product market rivals. Puzzlingly, the other way in which our results differ from the original paper is that we find stronger evidence of strategic complementarity in R&D in Table 5 . The estimates of the R&D equation
suggests that firm R&D is complementary to the R&D of firm's peers in both product market space and technology space.
6 See BSV Appendix A.3.
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What do these estimates imply about the marginal social return to R&D? We conduct a simple welfare analysis as in BSV in determine how the updated results affect estimates of the marginal private return (MPR) to R&D and the marginal social return (MSR). The marginal private return measures the change in firm output due to an increase in firm R&D, and the marginal social return measures the change in aggregate output due to an increase in firm R&D. Under certain assumptions, BSV
show that we can calculate the marginal social return as:
where Y G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ 1 is the elasticity of production with respect to R&D stock and ψ 2 is elasticity of production with respect to the technology spillovers SP ILLT EC. The formula for MSR captures the effect of increasing R&D on the firm's own output through ψ 1 and it's effect on other firms through ψ 2 .
Similarly, the marginal private return can be calculated as
where σ is the share of the reduction in market value which is due to a decline in output as opposed to a decline in price and is assumed to be one half, and γ 1 is the the elasticity of market value with respect to SP ILLSIC.
Evaluating the marginal social return at the median output to R&D stock ratio R&D reflects the fact that our lower estimate of ψ 1 is almost perfectly offset by the higher estimated output elasticity with respect to technology spillovers (ψ 2 ).
Conclusion
This paper has updated the results of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) .
We include an additional 15 years of data in our analysis of the effects of spillovers on firm value, productivity and R&D, and an additional 6 years of data in our analysis of the effects of spillovers on firm patenting, increasing our sample size by between two to three fold. The updated estimates are broadly similar to the original findings. We show that there are large positive spillovers among technologicallyclose firms, and negative spillovers from product market rivals due to the business stealing effect. In contrast to the BSV we find a negative effect of rivals' R&D on firm knowledge production as measured by citation-weighted patents. We also find
Figures SIC Figure 1 : Market Value Equation Notes: Dependent variable is ln(sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls for current and lagged industry sales in each firm's output industry. Standard errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction.
(1) Notes: Dependent variable is ln(sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls for current and lagged industry sales in each firm's output industry. Standard errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction. Notes: Dependent variable is ln(R&D/sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls for current and lagged industry sales in each firm's output industry. Standard errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction. Notes: Dependent variable is ln(R&D/sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls for current and lagged industry sales in each firm's output industry. Standard errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction.
